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November 7, 2008 1 Introduction
Thetaxationofcouples andfamilies has undergone substantial changesinthe
last decades. Among the major economies, joint taxation is still in place in
the US and in Germany. At the same time, there is an obvious international
trend to move from joint taxation to individual taxation with or without
additional child bene…ts. Joint taxation is perceived as an obstacle against
increasing labor supply of wives because marginal tax rates are higher than
under individual taxation. In a progressive income tax scheme with rising
marginal tax rates, joint taxation yields tax savings when income of the
spouses is distributed in an uneven fashion. At the same time, the marginal
tax rate related to the smaller income will be higher than under individual
taxation to generate a …xed tax revenue per capita. Moreover, joint taxation
is not very precise as ameans to encourage fertility, as all possible tax savings
are independent of the number of children. Nevertheless, when mothers
have to reduce labor supply at least temporarily, joint taxation reduces the
opportunity cost associated with foregone labor income.
In this paper we argue that joint taxation is not e¢cient. A Pareto
improvement can be achievedby moving to individual taxation, accompanied
by appropriate child bene…ts. The argument runs as follows. Joint taxation
distorts the decisions of individuals stronger than individual taxation. When
moving from individual taxation to joint taxation, substitution e¤ects drive
labor supply down and fertility up. Replacing joint taxation with individual
taxationto arriveat thesame budget de…citper capitawill be associated with
an increased labor supply and a smaller marginal income tax. Applying the
Pareto criterion requires that we compare allocations where all individuals
exist in either allocation. The idea therefore is to adapt a child bene…t
when moving from joint taxation to individual taxation so as to keep fertility
constant. Since the distortion of labor supply is reduced, the reform toward
individual taxationraises welfare. Applying the same method toa move from
joint taxation to some scheme of family tax splitting also yields a Pareto
1improvement via an increasing labor supply.
In principle, it does not make sense to introduce a child bene…t when
income taxation already distorts the fertility decision upwards. This may be
di¤erent inan environment with positive externalities of having children. For
example, positive externalities of fertility exist if a pay-as-you-go scheme is
present where the return to social security contributions rises with a higher
number of individuals in the following generation (see Cigno et al., 2003).
The literature on the taxation of couples has mainly treated fertility as
exogenous. Kleven et al. (2006) do not even consider children or household
production explicitly. In an optimum taxation model where the couple de-
termines the labor supply of both the primary and the secondary earner, it
turns out that the optimal marginal tax of one individual decreases in the
income of the other individual. This property of negative jointness is not
satis…ed in real-world income tax schemes, neither with individual nor with
joint taxation. If the primary earner is extremely rich, the marginal tax on
secondary income converges to zero. Apps and Rees (2007) introduce house-
hold production into the model of Boskin and Sheshinski (1983). They argue
that both joint taxation and individual taxation are inferior to selective tax-
ation where female labor income is taxed at lower marginal rates than the
wages of males. This message can clearly be traced back to the principle
of Ramsey taxation stating that taxes should be lowest where labor supply
elasticities are particularly high. While joint taxation eliminates possible
distortions of the technical rates of substitution between household and mar-
ket production (Piggott and Whalley, 1996), joint taxation never constitutes
the optimal policy because Ramsey taxation requires to distort all activities
(Apps and Rees, 1999). It cannot even be excluded that the optimum tax
regime requires a smaller marginal tax on the income of the primary earner
(Kleven and Kreiner, 2003).
The empirical literature literature on reforms aiming at changing the tax-
ation of couples seems inconclusive. Feldstein and Feenberg (1996), consid-
ering a possible move in the US from joint taxation to reduced tax rates for
2married women, …nd strong labor supply increases of these women that con-
tribute substantially to …nancing the tax cut. Steiner and Wrohlich (2008)
analyze moves from joint income taxation to di¤erent speci…cations of family
tax splitting. As their estimates of labor supply elasiticities are small, such
reforms have mainly distributional impacts, where all reforms yield gains for
the rich and losses for the poor. Beblo et al. (2004) arrive at similar conclu-
sions when considering a move from the German joint taxation scheme to the
French system of family tax splitting, stressing that substantial labor supply
reactions can be expected only for rich women with more than two children.
Another strand of the literature is concerned with the impacts of alterna-
tive policy instruments on fertility and female labor supply. Apps and Rees
(2004) show that introducing a subsidy for purchased child care …nanced by
a reduction of family allowances will increase both fertility and female labor
supply. Furthermore, increasing the male tax rate and reducing the female
tax rate so as to keep total tax revenue constant always increases labor sup-
ply, while the impact on fertility depends both on the weight of fertility in
the utility function and on the elasticity of substitiution between di¤erent
types of child care. Although the price of a child increases due to a higher
opportunity cost, fertility may increase due to an income e¤ect if the female
labor supply reaction is strong. Cigno (1983, 1986) argues that the govern-
ment would like to accompany child subsidies by taxes on adult consumption
to avoid a smaller investment in child quality when fertility increases.
In other settings a distributional objective of the government determines
the tax policy. Cremer et al. (2003) obtain optimal marginal tax rates de-
creasing in the number of children in an optimal taxation problem where the
government can observe the number of children and total income, but not
working hours. Balestrino (2001) considers a rich set of instruments with a
wage tax, a tax (or subsidy) on the number of children and indirect taxes
referring to consumption goods of children and adults. With identical wages
across households, all goods, including children, will be taxed according to
a Ramsey rule to achieve symmetric distortions of decisions. Imposing the
3usual structure of preference for the quantity and quality of children, dis-
tributional considerations lead the government to subsidize the number of
children and to tax child consumption in order to redistribute toward poor
families. However, if demand for consuming child-speci…c commodities de-
creases with a higher wage rate of the mother, the size of the family will be
taxed while child-speci…c commodites are subsidized (Balestrino et al., 2002,
Cigno and Pettini, 2002).
Finally, Fraser (2001) considers parents who reduce fertility as a response
to income risk. Employing child bene…ts instead of lump-sum bene…ts can
then bring about a Pareto improvement by encouraging an increase in fer-
tility. While he does not address the choice of the tax regime, this line of
reasoning indicates that joint taxation provides some additional insurance
agains losses from unemployment and may thus increase fertility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
our model. In Section 3, we analyze the consequences of moving from joint
to individual taxation with adapting policy instruments so as to keep both
fertility and the government budget balanced. Section 4 deals with a similar
move from joint taxation to family tax splitting, and the …nal Section 5
discusses our main …ndings.
2 The model
Consider a homogenous population of couples where the utility function
U(c;n;l) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in its arguments con-
sumption c, the number of children n and leisure of the wife l. We neglect
the integer constraint on the number of children. There are three uses of
time, namely work, leisure and time spent with children. Total time is nor-
malized to unity, and raising one child requires k units of time and p units
of the consumption good. The child bene…t is equal to ¯. Each household
has an exogenous income y0 that is earned by the husband. This assumption
re‡ects the …nding of the empirical literature that labor supply elasticities of
4husbands in their prime age are generally very close to zero. The wife’s wage
rate is w, and the income tax T depends on the two earned incomes. Hence,
the household’s budget equation is
c = y0+ y1 ¡ T (y0;y1) ¡ n(p ¡ ¯) (1)
where y1 = w (1¡ l ¡ nk) is the wife’s income. For the sake of concreteness,
we assume that the wife is the secondary earner: y0 ¸ w. The government
provides g units of a public or private good per household, where the level is
…xed. This good does not enter the utility function explicitly. The govern-
ment uses a progressive tax function Á(y;t), with Á1 > 0; Á2 > 0; Á11 ¸ 0,
and Á12 > 0, where y denotes income of the taxable unit, t is a tax para-
meter, and the the index i denotes the derivative with respect to the ith
argument. The marginal tax rate is increasing weakly. However, in order
to make the analysis meaningful, we assume that the marginal tax rate in-
creases somewhere in the relevant range, that is, Á1((y0+ y1)=2) > Á1(y1) at
any y1 < y0.
The total tax that has to be paid by a couple with individual incomes y0
and y1 is







This speci…cation contains the pure joint taxation scheme as the boundary
case ® = 0 and the pure individual taxation scheme at the other boundary
® = 1: The budget equation of the government is
T ¡ ¯n ¡ g = 0; (3)
with g denoting public expenditure per household.
After inserting its budget constraint, the household chooses the number
of children n and leisure l so as to maximize utility
V(n;l) := U(c;n;l) s.t. (1):
5It shouldbe notedthat wedonotnecessarily arriveat auniquesolution tothe
optimization problem of the household, since the budget set is not convex.
Due to the progressive tax schedule, increasing the demand for leisure by
one unit repeatedly is associated with a decreasing loss in consumption. If
uniqueness and an interior solution are ensured, the …rst-order conditions are
Un ¡ Uc¼ = 0; (4)









is the marginal net price of leisure,
¼ := p ¡ ¯ + kÃ (7)
is the marginal net price of a child, and
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@y1







is themarginaltax rateof the household. Having anadditional childincreases
utility directly by Un: At the same time, it reduces consumption according
to the direct cost p net of the child allowance ¯; the gross opportunity cost
kw and the possible change of the income tax ¡wk @T=@y1. Increasing
the demand for leisure by one unit directly raises utility by Ul, but reduces
consumption according to the loss in net income given by w(1¡ @T=@y1):
We only consider situations with a positive net price of a child because
otherwise a solution to the optimization problem does not exist. Further,
we impose the regularity assumptions UccÃ ¡ Ucl < 0 and Ull ¡ UclÃ < 0,
that is, increasing labor supply and using the additional net wage income
for consumption decreases the marginal utility of consumption and increases
the marginal utility of leisure. Obviously, these regularity conditions are
ful…lled for additive-separable utility functions. We also assume that the
su¢cient second-order conditions are satis…ed, that is, Vnn < 0, Vll < 0 and
¢1 := VnnVll ¡ V 2
nl > 0.
63 Tax policy analysis
The …rst-order conditions implicitly de…ne the number of children n and
leisure l as functions of the three policy parameters, the tax structure para-
meter ®, the child bene…t ¯, and the tax rate parameter t:
n = n(¯;t;®); (9)
l = l(¯;t;®): (10)
We proceed by analyzing a change in the tax structure parameter ® when
the child bene…t ¯ and the tax rate parameter t are altered so as to stabilize
the number of children per household, n; and the public budget. In any
symmetric equilibrium, each mother has the same number of children and
eachhousehold pays thesame amount oftaxes net ofchild bene…ts. Changing
the tax structure parameter ® a¤ects child bene…ts as well as marginal and
average tax rates. Hence, we determine d¯=d® and dt=d® from
n(¯;t;®) ¡ ¹ n = 0; (11)
T(¯;t;®)¡ ¯n(¯;t;®)¡ g = 0; (12)
where we lightly abuse notation by using again the symbol T.
Let the dynamic evolution of the child bene…t and the tax rate parameter
be governed by the following system of di¤erential equations:
_ ¯ = f1(n(¯;t;®) ¡ ¹ n); (13)
_ t = f2(T(¯;t;®) ¡ g ¡ ¯n(¯;t;®)); (14)
with f1(0) = f2(0) = 0, f0
1 < 0 and f0
2 < 0. Hence, the child bene…t is
increased if fertility falls short of the target level ¹ n; and vice versa. Similarly,
the tax rate parameter is raised when the government runs a budget de…cit,
while tax rates will fall if we have a budget surplus. An equilibrium of this
dynamic system is locally asymptotically stable only if at the equilibrium








































For simplicity, we assume in the following that the su¢cient stability condi-
tion is satis…ed, that is, we have strict inequalities in each case.
Proposition 1summarizes the impacts of increasingtheshare of individual
taxation on the household demand structure and the policy parameters of
the government.
Proposition 1 Any increase of the share of individual taxation ® with ad-
ditional changes in the child bene…t ¯ and the tax rate parameter t so as to
keep fertility constant and the government budget balanced reduces demand
forleisure and increasesboth labor supplyand demand for consumption goods.
The child bene…t parameter ¯ can move in either direction. The marginal tax
rate of the household at the new equilibrium will be lower.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤
The result can be interpreted as follows. In a …rst step, shifting the tax
scheme toward individual taxation reduces the marginal tax rate. Therefore,
both the price of leisure and the price of a child go up through the higher
opportunity cost. At the same time, the tax rate parameter is adapted in
such a way that the total net tax the household pays stays constant if all
households behave symmetrically. As demandchanges are therefore governed
by substitution e¤ects only, we expect a rising labor supply and a falling
demand for children. The increase in labor supply, however, is associated
with a move to a higher marginal tax rate, which reduces the price of a
child. Moreover, as the additional wage income is spent on consumption, the
marginal utility of consumption falls, which reduces utility losses from costs
associated withincreasing fertility. Simulationexamples inAppendix B show
that the sum of the two indirect e¤ects that increase fertility may both be
weaker or stronger than the depressing e¤ect of the direct price increase.
8In a second step, the child bene…t is raised or reduced in order to reach
again the initial number of children. At given demand for leisure, labor sup-
ply moves in the opposite direction. Both this labor supply reaction and the
changed expenditure on child bene…ts requires adapting the tax rate para-
meter in the direction of the change in the child bene…t. Again, there is no
redistribution across households in a symmetric equilibrium. The di¤erence
between taxes paid and child bene…ts received is unchanged when all house-
holds react in an identical fashion. If the price of a child is reduced due to a
rising child bene…t, the initial price of a child is already achieved before the
marginal tax rate reaches its initial level. The new equilibrium is associated
with a smaller marginal tax rate. Due to the absence of redistribution across
households, the labor supply decision will be driven by a substitution e¤ect
according to the new price of leisure. As this price lies lower than in the
initial situation, labor supply and consumption will increase, while leisure
falls.
Since the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
does not coincide with the marginal rate of transformation, moving the rela-
tive price closer to the marginal rate of transformation carries the potential
of a welfare increase. This suspicion is con…rmed by Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Any increase of the share of individual taxation ® with ad-
ditional changes in the child bene…t ¯ and the tax rate parameter t so as to
keep fertility constant and the government budget balanced increases welfare.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that dl=d® < 0: The stabilization
policy concerning fertility and net tax revenue implies that in a symmetric
equilibrium
c+ wl = constant (16)
holds true. Therefore, welfare changes according to
dU = Uc(c;l;¹ n)dc+ Ul(c;l;¹ n)dl = [Ul(c;l; ¹ n) ¡ wUc(c;l; ¹ n)w]dl (17)
if the number of children remains constant. Using the …rst-order condition
9governing the demand for leisure (5), we arrive at
dU
d®







Proposition 2 is easily understood. The policy experiment consists again
in simultaneously increasing the share of individual taxation, and varying
both the child bene…t and the marginal tax rate parameter so as to keep the
governmentbudget balanced and toinduce unchangedfertility. Proposition1
has established that this policy reduces the demand for leisure while keeping
the net tax constant. Since the demand for leisure was distorted upward in
the initial allocation, its reduction implies a welfare gain.
4 Family splitting
Family splitting can be perceived as a goal-directed instrument to support
families and to increase birth rates. Our model can easily be used to analyze
the impact of a move from simple joint taxation towards family splitting. In
order to do so, we rede…ne some basic variables and functions. First of all,
the tax of the household is written as







where ° 2 [0;1] is the children splitting factor. An increase in ° represents
a transition from couple-oriented income splitting towards family splitting.
Since with Á11 = 0 a change in ° has no direct impact on the marginal tax
rate, Á11 > 0 is assumed in this section. The direct e¤ect of an increase in °

















= Á1 > 0 (21)
10is the marginal tax rate of the household. Since under a progressive tax
schedule the marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax rate, an increase in °
reduces the tax burden of the family at a given tax parameter t.
Furthermore, a move towards family splitting also reduces the marginal






2 Á11 < 0: (22)
With family splitting, the net price of a child is









If ° > 0, the net price of a child under a family splitting scheme falls short of
p¡¯ + kÃ, because according to the tax formula additional children reduce
the family’s tax burden.
Comparingtheanalysisto the previous section, thereareonly two changes.
The de…nition of the net price of a child is modi…ed, and the individual tax-
ation factor ® is replaced by the family splitting factor °. The optimality
conditions on the household level are still given by (4) and (5), and the
equilibrium conditions for the government are analogous to (11) and (12).
However, since the net price of a child has changed, the expressions describ-
ing the impact of a change in the parameter ° on leisure and the marginal
tax rate look slightly di¤erent. Nevertheless, family splitting has a likewise
bene…cial impact on leisure and welfare, as summarized by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Any increase of the children splitting factor ° with additional
changes in the child bene…t ¯ and the tax rate parameter t so as to keep
fertility constant and the government budget balanced reduces demand for
leisure and the marginal tax rate of the household, and increases both labor
supply and demand for consumption goods. Welfare at the new equilibrium
will be higher.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
11Family splitting reduces the marginal tax rate just as individual taxation
does. Atthe sametime, thedirect impactonthe priceofa childis ambiguous.
First, the reduction of the marginal income tax increases the price of a child
via a higher opprtunity cost. Second, raising the children splitting factor
increases the tax saving factor °=(2+°n), which reduces the price of a child.
Third, the impact on the di¤erence between the marginal tax rate and the
average tax rate, @T=@y1 ¡ T(y0;y1)=(y0 + y1); is ambiguous. It will be
negative, and thus increase the price of a child if the degree of progessivity,
as measured by Á11; is not too large.
Hence, before adaptation of t and ¯; labor supply tends to increase, while
fertility may move in either direction. At given fertility, a rising labor supply
increases the marginal income tax, which reduces the opportunity cost of a
child. Spending the additional income on consumption reduces the marginal
utility of consumption and therefore also the utility loss associated with a
given price of a child. Finally, as the di¤erence between marginal tax and
average tax rate increases, the price of a child is reduced through a higher
tax saving.
Whileit would be necessary toincrease the tax parameter tto balance the
budget at unchanged behavior, the rising labor supply works in the opposite
direction. It turns out that labor supply is also higher in the newequlibrium,
and the overall e¤ect on the marginal tax rate is negative. As in the case
of moving toward individual taxation, increasing the family splitting factor
raises welfare because it reduces the distortion on labor supply.
5 Concluding discussion
Our analysis has demonstrated that joint taxation is inferior to both individ-
ual taxationand family tax splittingina homogenous householdenvironment
for a fairly general framework of income tax schedules and utility functions.
Among all tax schemes being considered, joint taxation is associated with
12lowest labor supply and the highest marginal tax rate on the earnings of the
wife.
An obvious question is how the case in favor of replacing joint taxation
by individual taxation can be made in an environment with heterogeneous
households. The task is far from easy because changes in the structure of tax-
ation will be associated with distributional consequences. Therefore, achiev-
ing a Pareto improvement sometimes require additional measures to correct
such distributional impacts.
The …rst possibility is that households are di¤erentiated according to the
exogenous income, being interpreted as wage income of the primary earner.
Richer households face a higher marginal tax under joint taxation for any
given labor supply of the secondary earner. As substitution and income
e¤ects work in the same direction, we may expect that fertility is higher and
labor supply is lower if the exogenous income y0 is higher. Moving from joint
taxation to individual taxation tends to harm rich and help poor households
at unchangedbehavior. Neutralizing the distributional impact may therefore
imply to use tax allowances rather than uniform child bene…ts.
A second scenario arises when considering households with di¤erences in
the wife’s wage rate. When changing this wage rate, income and substitution
e¤ectswork in opposite directions. Hence, thereisnotheoretical predictionin
which direction labor supply and fertility will react. The empirically relevant
case seems to consist in dominating substitution e¤ects, where wives with
a higher wage rate work more and have less children. Moving from joint
taxation to individual taxation at unchanged behavior will then redistribute
from the poor to the rich. This is a consequenceof the fact that joint taxation
reduces the tax load particularly strong when the two incomes are quite
uneven. At the same time, again at unchanged behavior, a uniform child
bene…t would redistribute income from rich to poor families.
Finally, we may consider households that are di¤erentiated with respect
tothe number of children. Couples may havedecidedagainst birthsor simply
cannot have children. We suppose that households without childrentypically
13display both a higher demand for pure leisure and a higher labor supply.
While amove towardindividual taxationtends toharmfamilies dueto amore
uneven distribution of individual incomes, the distributional consequences of
a possibly increasing child bene…t work in the opposite direction.
Moving from joint taxation to a family tax splitting scheme has analo-
gous consequences. Thechange is particularly bene…cial for richer households
with either a higher primary or secondary income. In both cases the redis-
tributional impact will typically be partially compensated by an increase in
the tax parameter and a cut of tax allowances. People without children are
harmed by moving to family tax splitting, but may bene…t from a cut of
child bene…ts.
Summing up, the argument against joint taxation will, with some modi…-
cations, presumably carry over to several generalizations with di¤erentiated
households. At the same time, it is clear that a Pareto improving transition
from joint taxation to either an individualized system or family tax splitting
becomes impossible in environments with di¤erences in several dimensions if
asymmetric information prevails across all dimensions.
Aninteresting question left open for future research lies inthe comparison
of individual taxation and family tax splitting at the maximum child factor.
It is not obvious whether these two schemes can also be ranked by employing
our methodology. Individual taxation tends to o¤er the strongest incentive
for labor supply of the secondary earner by imposing a heavy tax load on
the wage of the primary earner. On the other hand, considering a convex
combination of both schemes and increasing the share of individual taxation
can increase rather than decrease the marginal income tax before adapting
thetax parameter andthechild bene…t. Sucha surprisingreaction may occur
if both labor supply and fertility are high. Hence, though our simulations
currently suggest the superiority of the individualized scheme, it cannot be
excluded that the ranking of the two tax regimes ultimately depends on the
speci…cation of the utility function.
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15Using the second derivatives of V with respect to the endogenous variables
and the parameters






2 = Vnn < 0;





= Vnl = a21;





+ UccÃ2 = Vll < 0;






























and evaluating the derivatives of demand for childrenandleisurewith respect













[a11a22 ¡ a12a21][b21b13¡ b11b23]:






























16it follows that dl=® < 0. Recalling that the number of children is kept
constant, labor supply moves in the opposite direction. Since the net tax
stays constant, the increase in labor supply implies a rise in consumption.
























































¢[¡Ull + UclÃ + w[Ucl ¡ UccÃ]]
Given that UccÃ ¡ Ucl < 0 and Ull ¡ UclÃ < 0; this su¢ces to establish
d(@T=@y1)=d® < 0:
B: Ambiguous reaction of child bene…t
We consider the additively separable utility function U = ±clnc+ ±nlnn +
±l lnl, where ±c = 0:5, ±n = 0:3, and ±l = 0:2. Let the tax function be














The exogenous income of the primary earner is set to y0 = 2, the wage rate
of the secondary earner is w = 1:8, the number of children is stabilized at
n = 2; and the net tax revenue is g = 0:5.
Inthe …rst example, thedirect cost ofa childis set top = 0:4 andthe time
cost is k = 0:05. Moving the tax structure parameter continuously from ® =
0 to ® = 1 reduces the child bene…t monotonously from ¯(® = 0) = 0:0460
17to ¯(® = 1) = 0:0065. The tax parameter t declines from t(® = 0) = 0:1692
to t(® = 1) = 0:1084.
In the second example, the direct cost of a child is set to p = 0:2 and
the time cost is k = 0:2. Moving the tax structure parameter continuously
from ® = 0 to ® = 1 increases the child bene…t monotonously from ¯(® =
0) = 0:0164 to ¯(® = 1) = 0:0669: The tax parameter t declines from
t(® = 0) = 0:2407 to t(® = 1) = 0:1524.
C: Proof of Proposition 3
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1, and using

















































































































































Recalling that the number of children is kept constant, labor supply moves
in the opposite direction. Since the net tax stays constant, the increase in
labor supply implies a rise in consumption.











































Furthermore, dU > 0 can be derived using the same reasoning as inthe proof
of Proposition 2.
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